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Frasian Inference
Larry Wasserman
Abstract. Don Fraser has given an interesting account of the agree-
ments and disagreements between Bayesian posterior probabilities and
confidence levels. In this comment I discuss some cases where the lack of
such agreement is extreme. I then discuss a few cases where it is possi-
ble to have Bayes procedures with frequentist validity. Such frequentist-
Bayesian—or Frasian—methods deserve more attention.
1. INTRODUCTION
Don Fraser has long advocated the idea that users
of Bayesian methods have an obligation to study the
frequentist properties of those methods. He makes
the case quite forcefully when he states: “The failure
to make true assertions with a promised reliability
can be extreme with the Bayes use of mathematical
priors” and, more ominously:
The claim of a probability status for a sta-
tement that can fail to approximate con-
fidence is misrepresentation. In other ar-
eas of science such false claims would be
treated seriously.
I completely agree with Don and I enjoyed read-
ing his essay highlighting cases where approximate
confidence does or does not hold. In this comment I
will mention a few other places where Bayes meth-
ods have poor frequentist coverage. Then, on a more
optimistic note, I’ll discuss a few cases where Bayes
methods do have good frequentist properties. I’ll re-
fer to these methods as Frasian, both to honor the
author and as a handy way to refer to methods that
meld frequentist guarantees with Bayesian ideas.
Larry Wasserman is Professor, Department of Statistics
and Machine Learning Department, Carnegie Mellon
University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15217, USA
e-mail: larry@stat.cmu.edu.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2011, Vol. 26, No. 3, 322–325. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
2. HIGH-DIMENSIONAL MODELS
Don’s article shows that even in low-dimensional
parametric models, Bayesian probability statements
and confidence statements can diverge in nontrivial
ways. The situation can be dramatically worse in
high-dimensional and infinite dimensional models.
DKW versus DP
A simple example concerns estimating the cumu-
lative distribution function F . Let X1, . . . ,Xn ∼ F .
Let Fn(x) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 I(Xi ≤ x) be the usual empiri-
cal distribution function. By the famous DKW (Dvo-
retsky–Kiefer–Wolfowitz) inequality, we know that
sup
F
PF
(
sup
x
|Fn(x)−F (x)|> ε
)
≤ 2e−2nε2 .
Hence,
(L(x),U(x))
≡ (max{Fn(x)− εn,0},min{Fn(x) + εn,1})
is a valid 1 − α confidence band, if we set εn =√
1
2n log(2/α). (Of course, narrower bands are pos-
sible.)
The usual Bayesian approach is the DP (Dirichlet
Process) approach. Here, F is a given Dirichlet pro-
cess prior with mean F0 and concentration parame-
ter β, F ∼DP(F0, β). The posterior is DP(Fn, β+n)
where Fn =
β
β+nF0+
n
β+nFn. Let (L,U) be a poste-
rior 1−α confidence band. In general, the coverage
infF P(L≤ F ≤ U) is 0. This is a striking deviation
from frequentist validity. The frequentist estimator
can be recovered by formally letting β→ 0, although
doing so is to just give up on Bayes.
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Normal Means
Let Yi = θi+
1√
n
εi, i= 1,2, . . . , where ε1, ε2, . . . are
N(0,1). This is the standard Normal means problem
and many other problems, such as nonparametric
regression, have been shown to be equivalent to this
problem.
Suppose that θ = (θ1, θ2, . . .) is in the Sobolev el-
lipsoid
Θ =
{
θ :
∞∑
j=1
θ2i i
2p ≤C2
}
.
This corresponds to smooth regression functions in
the nonparametric regression problem. The mini-
max rate is n−2p/(2p+1) and simple shrinkage esti-
mators achieve this risk. Zhao (2000) and Shen and
Wasserman (2001) showed that the priors that yield
posterior that achieve the minimax rate are quite
strange and unnatural and are never used in prac-
tice. The obvious prior—Normal on each coordinate—
is not minimax unless we allow the prior to put zero
mass on Θ. This hints at the difficulties inherent in
melding Bayes and frequentist ideas in high dimen-
sions.
It gets worse when we look at the type of validity
that Don focuses on. Can we find a prior in this
problem such that the 1− α posterior regions also
have approximate 1 − α coverage? To the best of
my knowledge, there is no definitive answer. But the
results in Cox (1993) and Freedman (1999) suggest
that the answer is no.
Missing Data and Causal Inference
Robins and Ritov (1997) construct an example
that is motivated by missing data problems and
causal inference problems. I refer the reader to their
paper for details. But the punch line is dramatic.
The frequentist interval (based on the Horwitz–
Thompson estimator) shrinks at rate O(1/
√
n). For
a Bayesian region to have correct coverage, its size
will have to shrink no faster than a logarithmic rate.
Hence, there is a drastic loss in efficiency if we want
validity.
3. FRASIAN INFERENCE
Is it possible to force Bayesian methods to have
frequentist guarantees? Don’s article shows that the
answer can be subtle. It depends on the structure of
the model. Here I highlight two general techniques
where we can force the Bayesian procedure to have
finite sample frequentist guarantees.
Prediction
Let pi(θ|Y n) ∝ f(Y n|θ)pi(θ) denote the posterior
where Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn). The predictive distribution
for a new observation Z (drawn from the same dis-
tribution as Y n) is pi(z|Y n) = ∫ f(z|θ)pi(θ|Y n)dθ.
The usual Bayesian approach for prediction is to
choose a set B such that
∫
B pi(y|Y n)dy = 1− α. Of
course, B need not have frequentist coverage valid-
ity.
But we can adapt the ideas in Vovk, Gammerman
and Shafer (2005) to get a predictive region A with
finite sample frequentist validity. To construct A, we
test the null hypothesisH0 :Z = z using the Bayesian
predictive density as a test statistic. We then invert
the test to get A. Here are steps in detail:
1. Fix Z at some value z.
(a) Set Yn+1 = z and form the augmented data
set Y1, . . . , Yn, Yn+1.
(b) Compute the predictive density pi(·|Y1, . . . ,
Yn, Yn+1) =
∫
f(·|θ)pi(θ|Y1, . . . , Yn, Yn+1)dθ.
(c) Compute the discrepancy statistics D1, . . . ,
Dn+1 where Di=pi(Yi|Y1, . . . , Yn, Yn+1), i=1, . . . ,
n+ 1.
(d) Compute the p-value p(z) for testing H0 :
Z = z by
p(z) =
1
n+1
n∑
i=1
I(Di ≤Dn+1).
Under H0, D1, . . . ,Dn+1 are exchangeable so this
is a valid p-value.
2. After computing the p-value p(z) for each value z,
invert the test: let
A= {z :p(z)≥ α}.
It follows that
P(Z ∈A)≥ 1−α.
This is true no matter what the prior is. In fact, it is
true even if the model is wrong. Using the Bayesian
predictive region as a test statistic is how we let the
prior enter the problem. A good prior might lead to
small prediction regions A. Thus, validity is guar-
anteed; only efficiency is in question. Here we are
making use of the Bayesian machinery while main-
taining frequentist validity. I will refer to A as the
frequentized region.
Figure 1 shows a toy example. The data areN(θ,1)
and the prior is θ ∼N(0,1). To make the effect clear,
we use a tiny sample size of n= 2 and we use α=
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Fig. 1. In the top plot Y1, Y2 ∼ N(0,1). In the bottom plot Y1, Y2 ∼ N(5,1). In both cases, the prior is θ ∼ N(0,1). The
two vertical lines show the locations of the two data points. The dashed horizontal line is the frequentized region. The solid
horizontal line is Bayes predictive region.
0.05. The top plot shows the case where θ = 0 so the
prior is consistent with the truth. The two vertical
lines show the locations of the two data points. The
dashed horizontal line is the frequentized region.
The solid horizontal line is Bayes predictive region.
The second plot shows an example with θ = 5.
Here there is a conflict between the prior and the
truth. The Bayes region is shorter but of course does
not have frequentist validity. The frequentized re-
gion is longer. This is the compensation for having
a bad prior.
Weighted Hypothesis Testing
Consider testing m null hypotheses H01, . . . ,H0m
based on p-values P1, . . . , Pm. The Bonferroni me-
thod takes the rejection set to beR= {j :Pj ≤ α/m}.
It is well known that this procedure controls the er-
ror rate in the sense that
P(R∩H0 6=∅)≤ α,(1)
where H0 = {j :H0j is true}.
Suppose we have prior information that favors
some of these null hypotheses. We could include
this prior information by adopting a Bayesian
analysis. But then we lose the frequentist guaran-
tee given in (1). Is there a way to tilt the anal-
ysis according to our prior information while pre-
serving (1)? The answer is yes. Simply replace the
p-values by weighted p-values Pj/wj and carry out
the Bonferroni procedure. As long as the prior
weights are non-negative and sum to one, then (1)
still holds. (See Roeder and Wasserman, 2009, and
Genovese, Roeder and Wasserman, 2006.) Although
not formally a Bayesian procedure, it does allow us
to have a nugget of Bayesianism by including prior
weights while still preserving the frequentist guar-
antee.
For one-sided testing of Normal means, the opti-
mal weights are wj = (m/α)Φ(θj/2+ c/θj), where Φ
is the Gaussian survivor function and c is the con-
stant that makes the weights sum to one. The opti-
mal weights depend on the unknown means θj . Here
is another opportunity to blend frequentist with
Bayes by using a prior on the θj ’s to optimize the
weights.
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4. CONCLUSION
Don Fraser has shown that, except in special cir-
cumstances, Bayesian posterior probabilities and fre-
quentist confidence can diverge. The degree of di-
vergence depends on features of the model such as
nonlinearity.
I have discussed cases where the divergence can be
extreme. On the other hand, I have also discussed
some approaches for forcing Bayesian methods to
have frequentist validity. But in general, we must
be vigilant and pay careful attention to the sampling
properties of procedures. Don’s paper is a useful re-
minder of the need for that vigilance.
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